11: Going Bananas in Guatemala 1954
As George C. Marshall was being honored for the Marshall Plan designed to spur a peaceful economic recovery in Europe, his friend William Pawley was becoming involved in more hostile activities. In response to Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman calling for agrarian reform that would impact profits of United Fruit and coffee growers, the CIA drew up a contingency plan to overthrow him. CIA Director Allen Dulles wanted “a coordinated effort in the political field.” Dulles felt that “the exact steps which might be politically feasible are matters beyond our competence here” nonetheless “we have a legitimate interest, it seems to me, in seeing that the climate is right for the types of action in which we may be engaged.”
Dulles suggested “sending a two-fisted guy to the general area on a trip of inspection and
to report to the President.” Who did he have in mind? “Bill Pawley or someone of his type might
be considered. I recognize that Pawley is hard to control, but he is fearless and gets things done
even though he may break a little crockery in doing it. I would suggest that he might also spend a
little time in the countries bordering on one of our chief concern.”1
Prior to Dulles envisioning Pawley’s new role, covert “Security Clearance” had been requested by the CIA’s Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere (WH-IV aka WH/4)—the Caribbean region—for Pawley to “be used in Project DTROBALO as a means of offering employment and resettlement to rehabilitated disposees [sic].” Pawley it was noted “has many contacts and business interests in Latin America which will be valuable in the resettlement phase of the Project. He is not to be used as a consultant. He will be used on a witting basis” and his cover story would be “Governmental” rather than “Commercial” or “Other.”
Under remarks it was stated that Pawley “has had Government clearances of some type, having held the following positions: Ambassador to Peru and Brazil; Special Assistant to Secretary of State and to Secretary of Defense. The clearance request has been discussed with Mr. Osborn, Extension 629, (Cover Division).”2 The June 17, 1952 clearance request for Pawley took months to be granted and once granted lasted until the end of 1954.
Two months before the request for Pawley’s clearance regarding DTROBALO, the CIA distributed a report from his beloved Cuba. “Carlos Prio Socarras, the deposed President of Cuba, has requested a visa to visit Panama, but his request has been refused.” A Field Comment indicated that after the Panamanian elections in May he would probably be allowed into the country.3
DTROBALO was the CIA cryptonym for a program at Fort Clayton, near the Panama Canal. The CIA used the base as a dark-site, secret interrogation center for defectors from the Soviet Union and other countries. Apparently, Pawley’s original role would be to offer vetted defectors—the Spanish-speaking ones, especially—employment and housing in a new location if they were willing to cooperate with the U.S. government.
If defectors weren’t willing, the CIA took other measures. A Bulgarian defector processed through DTROBALO had voiced hostility against the U.S. and wasn’t easily “rehabilitated” so he became a candidate for mind-altering drugs or other methods to change his mood. Drugging to alter an individual’s perspective was a key component of the CIA’s Project ARTICHOKE.4 Later, Sidney Gottlieb advanced the Agency’s mind-control experimentation— MKULTRA—using LSD and other mind-bending drugs.5
Pawley’s role soon evolved as Fort Clayton (FJHOPEFUL) became the staging base for Operation PBFORTUNE, the overthrow of Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman— for the sake of American coffee drinkers. “Anything affecting coffee exportations to the U.S. would be nearly a knockout blow”—according to CIA Director Allen Dulles in March 1953 who believed Pawley was crucial to success.6
At about the same time, George P. Loker, Jr., Special Agent in Charge, FBI Washington Field Office, sent a memorandum to the Chief, Special Investigative Division, and attached a final report on Pawley dated March 4, 1953. It noted that “the Treasury Department has not conducted any investigative activity since 1945” and that additional information about Pawley “should be available at the Indian desk, U.S. State Department, and Criminal Investigation Division, U.S. Army. In view of limitation placed on this assignment, these phases will not be pursued.”7
A March 8, 1953 memorandum expressed that political support was needed from other countries for a coup in Guatemala to succeed.8 The CIA project soon gained the support of Nicaragua’s Somoza and the Dominican Republic’s Trujillo, both friends of Pawley.
On March 11, 1953, the CIA’s Chief, Special Security Division, Robert H. Cunningham, advised the Deputy Security Officer that “leads [at the Indian Desk, State and Army] will be pursued if you so request.”9
Six months later the FBI was having a problem requesting information about Pawley because his name was being misspelled (for example, Pauley) and “it takes at least an hour to obtain files.” While President Eisenhower was in favor of using Pawley, the CIA Director’s brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “stated that there was information indicating possible payoffs in Cuba to Pawley where Pawley acted as an advisor on some transportation project.”10
On August 12, 1953, PBFORTUNE became known as PBSUCCESS.11 The plan encompassed psychological warfare, political action, subversion and other components of paramilitary war including the option of assassination.12
The CIA feared that Arbenz was establishing a “Soviet Beachhead” in Guatemala, which represented “a threat to the welfare of the United States.” Six countries were called upon to support the CIA’s “Unconventional Warfare”—to contribute “the necessary covert assistance to enable the anti-Communist elements to dispose of the Communists in a thorough manner.”13
As if to justify to the rest of the world the necessity to overthrow a democratically elected President, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pushed through a resolution at the 10th Inter- American Conference meeting in Caracas, Venezuela stating that Communist domination of any state in the Americas would be considered a threat to the entire Western Hemisphere and would be met with a collective counteraction.14
R.L. Bannerman, Director of Security, finally approved Pawley’s use on the Guatemala project and sent a memo to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. “The Office of Security recently issued a Covert Security Approval to permit the utilization of Mr. William Douglas Pawley by the Western Hemisphere Division/Special Activities. He will be special contact for the Station in Miami, Florida.” The memorandum noted that “Mr. Pawley is a prominent Florida business executive who served as Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, was an assistant to the Secretary of State in 1948 and 1951, and an assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 1951. In more recent years he was engaged in petroleum and mining activities in the Dominican Republic and served as a consultant to the Dominican Government.”15 The CIA had validated what Pawley already knew; he had the bona fides—as well as financial investments—to qualify him to be an ardent fighter against communism in the Caribbean region.
On May 16, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles and the President called upon Pawley “to advise the administration on how to invoke the Caracas Resolution at an upcoming meeting of the Organization of American States” just after a ship arrived in Guatemala with 2,000 tons of weapons from Czechoslovakia.
Pawley soon found himself discussing the coup with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland and former Ambassador Walter Donnelly who had left his position as High Commissioner to Germany to take a lucrative job as a representative for U.S. Steel in Latin America. Pawley and Donnelly “were given offices in the State Department next to those of Henry Holland and held daily sessions.” These were frequently “attended either by Allen Dulles or by Frank Wisner of the CIA. All of the CIA’s facilities were placed at our disposal.”
The 800-acre Pawley farm in The Plains, Virginia became a center of planning activity where he and Edna entertained officials from other Latin American countries, as well as Pentagon and State Department officials and J. C. King from the CIA’s covert operations planning group. King would play a significant role in Pawley’s life in the coming years. Pawley also grew close to Vice President Nixon whose anti-communist fervor matched his own.16
Donnelly soon dropped out of the project to keep his U.S. Steel job, but Pawley’s group was ably assisted by Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Thruston Morton and “John Peurifoy, ambassador to Guatemala and a key figure throughout the project.” Other important participants included Whiting “Whitey” Willauer, Chennault’s partner in CAT and Ambassador to Honduras during the Guatemala upheaval who was “a master of half a dozen languages including Chinese,” Ambassador Robert Hill in Costa Rica, and Ambassador Tom Whelan in Nicaragua.17
Pawley was issued a Diplomatic Passport on June 7, 1954 for an unspecified trip. This was one week before the Arbenz coup.18 The Pawleys hosted a gathering of more than two dozen South and Central American Ambassadors and influentials to try to gain their support for keeping communism out of Central America.19
In early June, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, prepared a memorandum for the record about a meeting with Pawley and Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel regarding the sale of planes to KMFLUSH [Nicaragua] and whether the Battle Act Prohibition on shipment of strategics would be applied to WSBURNT [Guatemala]. Presumably Pawley will discuss these suggestions in the Department.”20
During the Guatemala coup planning, air cover for the coup plotters led by exiled Guatemalan, Colonel Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas, became a big issue. Head of the Directorate of Plans Frank Wisner urged CIA Director Dulles to minimize the rebel air force because he feared it would expose the U.S. role in the coup. Dulles concurred. Pawley knew all too well from his China days the important difference adequate airpower could make in war and “tried but failed to convince him that an underestimation of the aircraft needs of the Guatemalan liberation force could be fatal to the mission.” Allen Dulles “was adamant, however, and I finally yielded, much against my better judgment, although the final decision was mine.”21
But after he allowed Dulles to reduce the air cover to three fighter-bombers, Pawley became distraught when two of the planes were found to be out-of-commission on the very day the coup began, June 14, 1954. In the end, when it became evident that more planes were needed, Dulles and Pawley argued their case against Ambassador Holland in front of President Eisenhower who told Pawley to purchase the planes.22
In October 2016, Holland’s son, William, wrote me that his father emphatically insisted “that replacing the planes would expose our role in the coup and reinforce the perception of the U.S. as the ‘bully from the North.’ My father, who opposed the entire scheme from the moment he was clued in about it, probably felt it was his last chance to shut down the entire subversion. But Dulles prevailed, and Ike opted for replacing the planes, planes that Pawley—in order to by- pass red tape—'generously’ agreed to pay for out of his own pocket.”23
In Pawley’s autobiography he reprinted a letter sent to him by Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa regarding the deal made to secure the cooperation of General Anastasio Somoza, the dictator of Nicaragua, which was needed to ensure the success of the PBSUCCESS coup. Sevilla-Sacasa stated that Somoza personally thanked Pawley “for the immediate cooperation which you so graciously gave us in the purchase of the three airplanes that my country needed.” He went on to describe Pawley as “an excellent friend who has always known how to interpret the dangerous times in which America is living, as a consequence of the aggressive politics of International Communism.”24
The planes came from Civil Air Transport (CAT) with the help of Whiting Willauer, the former Flying Tiger member and CAT director. Willauer was stationed in nearby Honduras as U.S. Ambassador. At one point, Willauer wrote his friend from the Flying Tigers, General Claire Chennault, that he was “literally working night and day” on Guatemala. The planes dropped propaganda leaflets created by E. Howard Hunt and David Atlee Phillips (aka Knight) that carried the message “people of Guatemala ... rise as a single man against this enemy of God and country”—and they strafed the capital of the Republic of Guatemala on June 25, 1954.
One CIA operative, Rip Robertson, bombed a British chartered boat, Springfjord, which he successfully sank in the port of San Jose at the behest of General Somoza. Robertson’s bombing run ignored the orders of his CIA bosses, Tracy Barnes and Albert Haney, to use a less conspicuous approach utilizing a clandestine frogmen demolition team to sink the boat.25
According to E. Howard Hunt, the stimulus for the coup was a lobbying effort by United Fruit’s Washington lawyer Thomas G. Corcoran. He is the same person who had earlier served the Chinese Nationalists when Corcoran and his brother, David, ran Chinese Defense Supplies in the early 1940s in partnership with Chiang’s brother-in-law, T.V. Soong, the company’s chairman. Soong’s $200 million account at Bank of America in the 1950s was managed by Corcoran as well.26
“Tommy the Cork” Corcoran, as he was known, had been a fixture in the cabinet of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and had written much of the New Deal legislation, which drew the contempt of many big business interests. Once out of the cabinet, however, he became a valuable voice in Washington for those formerly hostile interests. Henry Luce who previously denounced Corcoran as a “shifty New Dealer” now counted him as an ally.27
Despite his liberal image, Corcoran joined the increasingly conservative, anti-Red China lobby as its chief spokesperson. Decades later, when Ronald Reagan became president in 1980, Corcoran and Anna Chennault, Claire’s widow, hosted a party for members of the new administration at Blair House, across the street from the White House. In those days of lacks security in the nation’s capital, this author—without press credentials—was able to walk past marine guards and videotape some of the guests at the gathering. Among those in attendance eager to pose for the camera was William Casey, President Reagan’s nominee for CIA Director who would eventually get entangled with Oliver North in the Iran-Contra arms-for-hostage deal in which Nicaragua once again played a significant role.28
United Fruit, Corcoran’s client in 1954, was controlled by members of the DuPont family which at the time swung considerable clout because the 50 relatives had over “$150 billion worth of assets,” including 65% of the stock in America’s then largest corporation, General Motors.29 When Arbenz issued his land reform edict for Guatemala, United Fruit feared it would be costly to its Chiquita banana division, so Thomas Corcoran was dispatched to the White House to meet with President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. Ike then turned matters over to CIA Director Dulles and his Deputy Director Charles Cabell who placed C. Tracy Barnes in charge of the semiautonomous operation.30
On June 25, 1954, Pawley and the other dozen members of Eisenhower’s coup planners, known as the Guatemalan Group, met in Washington to discuss their fears that Arbenz could become a hero if the coup failed. But, two days later, after the CIA-trained army easily marched across the border from Honduras and installed their leader, Arbenz resigned and was put on a plane to Czechoslovakia.31
Henry Holland was asked by the Ambassador to Guatemala to provide an assessment of “Bill Pawley’s usefulness.” Holland wrote on July 11, 1954 that Pawley had three unusual assets, “sound judgment ... resourcefulness in devising means of achieving an end ... ability to inspire the liking and confidence of people with whom he deals.” In addition, Pawley “appears to be a man of considerable integrity and to be motivated exclusively by what he feels to be the effect of his actions on government interest irrespective of what they may be on his own.”
Holland noted two “liabilities.” Pawley’s “health. He has a stomach condition which causes him intense discomfort when placed under sustained strain such as that he went through in working on the Guatemalan question ... [and] rather substantial personal business interests which may require a good deal of his time.” But Holland believed “Pawley would perform outstandingly on almost any assignment. His abilities as a lone operator are generally recognized. On the Guatemalan assignment he functioned smoothly as a team member.”32
On July 13, 1954 the new Castillo Armas government was granted official recognition by the United States. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent congratulatory telegrams to the U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala, John Peurifoy, and his counterpart in Nicaragua, Ambassador Willauer. CIA Director Allen Dulles and his team, “Tracy Barnes, J.C. King, Henry Heckscher, Rip Robertson, David Atlee Philips, and Albert Haney” then presented their success story to President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon.33
A highly redacted list of key CIA Personnel who had received Top Secret training on at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in preparation for PBSUCCESS includes Tracy C. Barnes, Thomas W. Braden, Paul B. Breitweiser, Emmons B. Brown, Charles M. English, Christian M. Freer, Cord Meyer Jr., Col. Jean W. Moreau (a Marine who fought in Okinawa) and E. Howard Hunt.34
E. Howard Hunt had been a young boy living with his father, a lawyer, in Miami Beach, Florida, while Pawley was speculating in Miami real estate during the Roaring Twenties. Hunt would later write admiringly about working with William Pawley during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in his book Give Us This Day which was published in 1973, shortly after Hunt was exposed as a conspirator in the Watergate break-in, the event that ironically toppled President Nixon.35
Charles English had previously served in the OSS and was proficient in 10 languages.36 C. Tracy Barnes would leverage his success in Guatemala to a more important position during the Bay of Pigs planning. Cord Meyer, Jr. became involved in a variety of other covert activities and his wife would die mysteriously in Georgetown section of Washington, DC.37
Following the Arbenz overthrow, Birch O’Neal, the CIA Station Chief in Guatemala, took an agency position under James Jesus Angleton running the Special Investigations Group which looked for communist “moles” who had infiltrated the agency. Oddly, he would eventually have a file on Lee Harvey Oswald., controlled by his assistant Betty Ergerter in the Office of Security, according to journalist/author Jefferson Morley’s review of declassified documents.38 A 1953 FBI memo stated that Angleton “has volunteered voluminous information of interest to the Bureau.” Angleton “is usually given considerable freedom and leeway in directing the operations of his unit. In general, he is responsible only to the Director of CIA.”39
A CIA post-mortem of PBSUCCESS considered it a successful undertaking from three perspectives—geopolitical, cost, and deniability. “This Project represents a historical departure from the international tradition of the United States Government and the first positive, successful measure short of direct intervention, to thwart the aggressive actions of the Soviet Union in this era known as the ‘Cold War.’” The coup’s cost “less recoverable assets” was a bit under the “budget allocation ... $3,000,000.” And perhaps equally important the CIA’s mission which was implemented on December 15, 1953 and concluded June 30, 1954 was successfully “accomplished and plausible denial retained.”40
Plausible deniability was a concern of many administrations in the age of covert action. It held that those actions should not be traceable back to the President of the United States. The plausible deniability doctrine policy remained a cornerstone of national security until Lt. Col. Oliver North broke it by testifying in 1987 that he was obeying President Reagan’s orders to covertly sell arms to Iran and divert the profits from the arms sales to the contras, which, coincidentally, were operating in Nicaragua.41 Despite this smack in the face of a Republican president, North was made into a hero of the right in the following decades, even serving as a correspondent for Fox News while raising fears among Baptists about radical Islam.42
The new Guatemalan president, Castillo Armas, stayed in power for 37 months, until assassinated by his bodyguard.43 He was succeeded by Miguel Ydigoras Fuentas, who would entertain New Orleans Mafia boss Carlos Marcello in March of 1961 after Marcello had been expelled from the United States by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. At the same time the CIA was training Cuban exiles in Guatemala for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion—a coup against Cuba’s Fidel Castro--which failed in the eyes of many, including Pawley’s, because of inadequate air cover.44
With his inclusion in the PBSUCCESS planning, Pawley had made the transition from trusted friend of Democratic President Truman and the OSS to trusted friend of the Republican President Eisenhower and the CIA. He also had passed numerous character investigations by the FBI and other agencies to work behind the scenes on some of the nation’s most sensitive projects.
FOOTNOTES:
1 3/8/1953 CIA “Memorandum Signed by CIA Director Allen Dulles re: P.B. FORTUNE.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala. Pages 79-80. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/guat/20175.htm.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Top Secret.
A handwritten note by Allen Dulles at the top of the page reads: “Copy left with W.B.S. on a personal basis—with understanding there would be no circulation.” W.B.S. would be former CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith.
The March 8, 1953 comment by Dulles about Pawley also appears in the 2003 government report: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Guatemala. (U.S. Printing Office). Page 79. Editor Susan K. Holly. General Editor David S. Patterson.
2 NARA 104-10265-10332 ~ 6/17/1952. Memo: “William Douglas Pawley (Covert Clearance Requested).” Subjects Pawley, W. D. From: WH – IV. To: OD/OP.
Issued by: Case Officer A. E. Le Vey, Security Officer C.R. Newton, and Branch Chief N.H. Smith.
3 NARA 124-10224-10231 ~ April 4/17/1952 Information Report: SO86362. Date of Info: March 20, 1952.
4 NARA 104-10404-10094 ~ 10/7/1977 Memorandum For: Anthony A Lapham. From: A.R. Cinquegrana, Office ofGeneral Counsel. Subject: Bluebird/Artichoke Soft File Review - "Kelly" - Dimitrov, D.A. [from January 27, 1952], Page 3.
Dutch Journalist Willem Oltmans claimed on WABC’s Good Morning America on September 8, 1977 that Dimitrov (aka General Donald Donaldson) was involved in the JFK assassination. Oltmans, however, had questionable motives.
NARA 1993.08.13.07:06:36:150014 ~ 10/11/1977 Blue Memorandum Re Dutch Journalist Altmans Who Appeared On Good. Page 2.
5 Stephen Kinzer, Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for Mind Control (St. Martin’s Press, Griffin Imprint).
NARA 1993.08.03.17:22:56:210028 ~ 3/6/1953 “Memorandum Pawley, William No. 78435-B S.I.” Subject: Pawley, William. From: George P. Loker, Jr. Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office. To: Chief, Special Investigative Division. Reference Headquarters Memo of Assignment, 17 February 1953. Prepared by Agent James E. Mackey, Jr.
... Subsequently after approximately one-half hour, [Deputy Attorney General] Rogers called Winterrowd and introduced him to General Persons ... [who] was interested in William D. Pawley ... Rogers apologized for giving the wrong spelling and in this regard Winterrowd advised him it takes at least an hour to obtain files ...Persons stated that the President thought they should utilize the services of Pawley and, accordingly, the White House checked with Department of State and Secretary Dulles stated that there was information indicating possible payoffs in Cuba to Pawley where Pawley acted as an advisor on some transportation project. General Persons said he assumed this came from the FBI reports ... It was pointed out to them that of course the Department of State could have investigated Pawley himself since that is frequently the case and that they, of course, also have reports and sources providing information to their Consulates and Embassies abroad ...
At this time [Monday, September 28, 1953] Rogers will be advised that we have conducted no investigation of William D. Pawley.
State Department’s Cryptonyms for Foreign Relations in Guatemala, 1952-54. Website page no longer available.
>>FJHOPEFUL is a military base. The State Department’s list included:
- AA, American Airlines; anti-aircraft
- A/C, aircraft
- AC/WH, Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency Adam, Guatemala City
- AFL, AFOL, American Federation of Labor AP, Associated Press
- BGGYPSY, Russia; Russian
- BOND, Puerto Barrios
- C/WH, Chief, Western Hemisphere, Central Intelligence Agency
- CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
- Caesar, Quetzaltenango
- CEUA, Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas (Committee of Anti-Communist University Students)
- CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
- CNC, Confederacion Nacional Campesina (National Confederation of Campesinos)
- CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
- CP, Communist Party
- CTAL, Confederacion de Trabajadores de América Latina (Confederation of Latin American Workers) DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
- DD/A, Deputy Director for Administration, Central Intelligence Agency
- DD/P, Deputy Director, Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- DIR, Director of Central Intelligence
- Doc, Mazatenango
- DTFROGS, El Salvador
- Eddie, El Quiché
- EDT, estimated time of departure
- ENE, east northeast
- ESCOBILLA, Guatemalan national
- ESMERALDITE, labor informant affiliated with AFL-sponsored labor movement
- ESSENCE, Guatemalan anti-Communist leader
- ETA, estimated time of arrival
- FAN, National Anti-Communist Front
- FAO, Foreign Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- FJHOPEFUL, military base
- FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
- Frank, Jutiapa, Guatemala
- Goss, Coban, Guatemala
- Hank, Zacapa (Guatemalan base)
- HTKEEPER, Mexico City
- HTPLUME, Panama
- iden, identity
- Ike, San Jose
- Jack, Florida, Honduras
- JMBLUG, John S. Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala
- Kent, Carias Viejas, Honduras
- KMFLUSH, Nicaragua
- KMPAJAMA, Mexico
- KMPLEBE, Peru
- K-Program, operations aimed at intelligence and defection of Guatemalan military; after May 11, 1954, redirected at military defections
- KUBARK, Central Intelligence Agency
- KUCLUB, Office of Communications
- KUFIRE, intelligence
- KUGOWN, propaganda
- Larry, Entre Rios, Guatemala
- LCFLUTTER, polygraph
- LCI, landing craft
- LCPANGS, Costa Rica
- LINC, LINCOLN, PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida LIONIZER, Guatemalan refugee group in Mexico
- MA, military attaché
- Mike, Asuncion Mita, Guatemala
- Nick, Gualan, Guatemala
- N.O., New Orleans
- o/a, on or about
- ODACID, U.S. Embassy
- ODUNIT, U.S. Air Force
- ODYOKE, U.S. Government
- OIR, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State OPIM, Operational Immediate
- ops, operations
- ORIT, Organizacion Regional Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (AFL-sponsored anti-Communist labor federation)
- P/A, political asset
- PAA, Pan American Airlines
- PANCHO, Carlos Castillo Armas
- PBFORTUNE, CIA project to supply anti-Arbenz forces with weapons, supplies, and funding; predecessor to PBSUCCESS
- PBHISTORY, Central Intelligence Agency project to gather and analyze documents from the Arbenz government in Guatemala that would incriminate Arbenz as a Communist
- PBPRIME, United States
- PBS, PBSUCCESS, Central Intelligence Agency covert operation to overthrow Arbenz government in Guatemala
- PSB, Psychological Strategy Board
- PW, psychological warfare
- QKFLOWAGE, United States Information Agency
- RUFUS, Carlos Castillo Armas
- sab, sabotage
- SARANAC, training site in Nicaragua
- SCRANTON, training base for radio operators near Nicaragua
- SGUAT, CIA Station in Guatemala
- SHERWOOD, CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954
- SKILLET, Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras
- SKIMMER, The "Group" CIA cover organization supporting Castillo Armas
- SLINC, telegram indicator for PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
- SSE, south southeast
- STANDEL, Jacobo Arbenz, President of Guatemala
- svcd, serviced
- SYNCARP, the "Junta," Castillo Armas' political organization headed by Cordova Cerna
- T/O, table of organization
- UFCO, UNFC, UNIFRUIT, United Fruit Company
- WASHTUB, operation to plant Soviet arms in Nicaragua
- WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions
- WH, Western Hemisphere
- WSBURNT, Guatemala
- WSHOOFS, Honduras
"Persons and Pseudonyms, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54." Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/persons
>> Key Players & Pseudonyms During the Arbenz Overthrow:
-
Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State January 19, 1949–January 20, 1953
-
Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo, President of Guatemala March 15, 1951–June 27, 1954
-
Ascham, Robert A., pseudonym for Allen Dulles
-
Bannister, Earl D., (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Barnes, Tracy (Playdon, William D.), Chief of the Political and Psychological Staff, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
-
Berry, Lampton J., Deputy Operations Coordinator, Department of State
-
Bissell, Richard M. (Lynade, Pinckney E.), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-
Bruce, David K.E., Under Secretary of State April 1952–January 1953
-
Burnette, Cyrus E., (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Cabell, General Charles P. (Ordway), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence after April 1953
-
Cabot, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs February 27, 1953–April 1954
-
Cadick, Irving G., (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Calligeris, John H., pseudonym for Carlos Castillo Armas
-
Castillo Armas, Colonel Carlos, President of the Guatemalan Junta from July 8, 1954; President of Guatemala September 2, 1954–July 26, 1957
-
Clower, Wilfred O., (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Córdova Cerna, Juan, lawyer for United Fruit Company in Guatemala; supporter of Castillo Armas
-
Díaz, Colonel Carlos Enrique, Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff; President of Guatemala June 27–28, 1954; member of military junta June 28–29, 1954
-
Dulles, Allen (Ascham, Robert A.), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 26, 1953; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence
-
Dulles, John Foster, consultant to the Secretary of State until April 1952; Secretary of State after January 21, 1953
-
Dunbar, Jerome C., (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Earman, J.S., senior assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence
-
Edwards, Colonel Sheffield (USA), Assistant Deputy Director of Administration for Inspection and Security, Central Intelligence Agency, after March 1952
-
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States
-
Esterline, Jacob D., Western Hemisphere Division, PBSUCCESS
-
Fortuny, José Manuel, leader of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo until June 1954
-
Galbond, Oliver G., pseudonym for Colonel J.C. King
-
Gutiérrez, Víctor Manuel, leader of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala
-
Hedden, Stuart, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 1953
-
Hediger, Donald, (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Helms, Richard, Chief of Operations, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
-
Holland, Henry F., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs March 2, 1954–September 13, 1956
-
Hunt, E. Howard (Walter C. Twicker), case officer and Chief, Propaganda Branch, Central Intelligence Agency
-
King, Colonel J.C. (Oliver G. Galbond), Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
-
Langevin, Paul D., pseudonym for David Atlee Phillips
-
Leddy, Raymond G., Officer in Charge of Central American and Panama Affairs, Office of Middle
American Affairs, Department of State, from January 1953
-
Lynade, Pinckney E., pseudonym for Richard M. Bissell
-
Magoffin, Francis D., (pseudonym, identity not released)
-
Mann, Thomas C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs November 1950–July 1953
-
Martínez, Major Alfonso (retired), Director of the National Agrarian Department in the Arbenzgovernment 1952–1954
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Miller, Edward G., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs June 1949–December 1952
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Monzón, Colonel Elfego, member of military junta of Guatemala June 28–29, July 3–September 1, 1954; leader of military junta June 29–July 3, 1954
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Ontrich, Matthew H., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Ordway, pseudonym for General Charles P. Cabell
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Page, Graham L., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Peurifoy, John E., Ambassador to Guatemala November 1953–October 1954
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Phillips, David Atlee (Paul D. Langevin), Field Director, Operation SHERWOOD
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Pivall, Vincent C., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Playdon, William D., pseudonym for Tracy Barnes
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Princep, Stirling D., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Reelfoot, Allen N., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Restrepo, Julio, (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Roosevelt, Kermit, senior official, Central Intelligence Agency
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Schoenfeld, Rudolf E., Ambassador to Guatemala until October 19, 1953
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Seekford, Jacob R., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Smith, General Walter Bedell (Starke), Director of Central Intelligence from October 7, 1950; Under
Secretary of State February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954
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Somoza García, Anastasio, President of Nicaragua May 1951–September 1956
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Starke, pseudonym for General Walter Bedell Smith
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Tofte, Major Hans V., member of the Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff, Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
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Toriello Garrido, Guillermo, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States September 1952–May 1954; Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs January–July 1954
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Trujillo, Molina Rafael L., President of the Dominican Republic until August 1952; Secretary of State for Foreign Relations March–August 1953
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Truman, Harry S, President of the United States until January 1953
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Twicker, Walter C., pseudonym for E. Howard Hunt
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Wellbank, Clayton S., (pseudonym, identity not released)
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Whiting, Harold S., pseudonym for Frank Wisner
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Willauer, Whiting, Ambassador to Honduras from March 5, 1954
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Wisner, Frank (Harold S. Whiting), Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
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Ydígoras Fuentes, General Miguel, Guatemalan presidential candidate during 1950 elections
The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 4 CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents by Kate Doyle and Peter Kornbluh. National Security Archives. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4
>> In addition to William Pawley, the Guatemalan Group leading the coup planning in Washington for President Eisenhower included Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Henry Holland, Burrows, Pearson, Wieland, Warren, Sparks, Jamison, Herron, Sanders, Atwood, Col. Clark, and Woodward.
The Guatemalan Government had been under Communist influence in varying degrees for the past ten years and over thirty indigenous attempts had been made to overthrow it; all were unsuccessful. Communist control had advanced rapidly in the past year ... Although a minority party, it manifested itself so dominantly it was estimated that the time had passed when any opposition group could organize sufficient strength without considerable outside assistance to overthrow the Communists ... CIA’s task was to provide the necessary covert assistance to enable the anti-Communist elements to dispose of the Communists in a thorough manner. An Unconventional Warfare operation was required and planned on a Top Operational Priority basis ... A special Regional Command was established and operations were conducted in and through six different countries.
FBI Advised files on subject furnished to the White House.
Passport Office.” From: [None]. To: [None].
- Agreed State Department will forthwith advise KMFLUSH Ambassador that aircraft would have to be sold to his government without the right of return to the United States, and the title would have to pass in the U.S. before delivery of planes to KMFLUSH ... possibility of making payment by deposit of irrevocable letter of credit payable in thirty days.
- Agreed that Defense will explore nature of contacts between U.S. military in WSBURNT and Sanchez with view to inviting Sanchez to travel to the United States ...
6.b. Possibility of official finding Battle Act Prohibition on shipment of strategics would be applied to WSBURNT. Presumably Pawley will discuss these suggestions in the Department.
Hi again, David--My dad's comment about Pawley's functioning smoothly as part of the team on "the Guatemalan assignment" is interesting in light of the fact that, during a confrontation with Allen Dulles over the issue of whether or not to replace the planes that Arbenz had shot down, Pawley must have vigorously opposed my father's emphatic insistence that replacing the planes would expose our role in the coup and reinforce the perception of the US as the "bully from the North." My father, who opposed the entire scheme from the moment he was clued in about it, probably felt it was his last chance to shut down the entire subversion. But Dulles prevailed, and Ike opted for replacing the planes, planes that Pawley--in order to by-pass red tape--"generously" agreed to pay for out of his own pocket..... In any event, my father and Pawley were sufficiently close that when my father's assets were frozen upon his death [July 18, 1962] while his will went into probate, Pawley stepped forward to cover my brother's tuition at Yale. It's possible he also paid for my tuition at a private day school.
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1983). Pages 116, 139, 145, 155, 193, 216, 217, 218, 228, 235, and 229.
: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group (Smithsonian History of Aviation:
Smithsonian Institution Press)
[Pawley is] mentioned in the press as connected with the so-called China Lobby.
>> In November 2008, General Motors, after years of building gas guzzling vehicles even as demand for oil increased globally and forced the price of gas to $4 a gallon, was reduced to going before Congress and begging for billions of dollars in a taxpayer bailout as its stock price fell to 1930s depression levels.
a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon’s military assistant
b. NSC 5412 Representativesc. Certain United States’ Senators and Representatives, particularly Senator George Smathers of Florida.
>> During the early Bay of Pigs Planning, CIA representative David A. Phillips met weekly with Henry Loomis, Director, Voice of America, regarding coordination of the United States Information Agency.
1) Unusually sound judgment,2) Unusual resourcefulness in devising means of achieving an end,3) Unusual ability to inspire the liking and confidence of people with whom he deals, and4) He appears to be a man of considerable integrity and to be motivated exclusively by what he feels to be the effect of his actions on government interest irrespective of what they may be on his own.”
1) His health. He has a stomach condition which causes him intense discomfort when placed under sustained strain such as that he went through in working on the Guatemalan question,2) He has rather substantial personal business interests which may require a good deal of his time. I am not certain how much time they would require,3) I have had no opportunity to judge his ability to organize, but I am aware of the fact that he has established and directed some rather large business enterprises.
In my opinion Pawley would perform outstandingly on almost any assignment. His abilities as a lone operator are generally recognized. On the Guatemalan assignment he functioned smoothly as a member of a team.”
Peurifoy and his son were killed in an auto accident the following summer. Castillo Armas was assassinated (1957). Suicide took the lives of William Pawley (1977); United Brands (United Fruit’s successor company) President Eli Black (1975); and Operation Success planner Frank Wisner (1965). Wisner’s son was named Ambassador to the Philippines (1991) and six years later joined the Board of Directors of Enron.
With the release of additional declassified JFK Assassination documents in 2018 and 2019, Jefferson Morley believes a dozen individuals within the CIA were aware of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to November 22, 1963. They were:
- James Angleton, counterintelligence chief
- Birch O’Neal, chief of the Special Investigations Group (C/SIG)
- Jane Roman, counterintelligence liaison officer (CI/L)
- Ann Egerter, SIG file chief
- William J. Hood, chief of operations, Western Hemisphere division
- Thomas Karamessines, assistant deputy director of plans
- Anita Potocki, chief of Foreign Intelligence, Staff D (FI/D)
- Will Potocki, officer, Counterintelligence Operations (CI/OPS)
- Charlotte Bustos-Videla, file chief, Mexico Desk (WH-3)
- Bill Bright, counterespionage officer, Soviet Russia division (SR/CE)
- Stephan Roll, counterintelligence officer, Soviet Russia division (SR/CI/RED)
- Win Scott, chief of station, Mexico City
- Ann Goodpasture, Scott’s deputy
- David Phillips, chief of Cuban operations
39 NARA 124-10326-10098 ~ 6/10/1953 FBI Memorandum “Central Intelligence Agency. Information Received From James Angleton.” To: A.H. Belmont. From: V.P. Keay.
40 CIA Review of Project PBSUCCESS, A Foreword. http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000928348/0000928348_0003.gif
... From the time the Project had been approved for implementation 15 December 1953, until its conclusion on 30 June 1954 ... LINCOLN, the Project’s Headquarters, sent 875 pouches and over 1300 dispatches. The budget allocation was $3,000,000 and the actual cost, less recoverable assets, was just under the original allocation.
The mission assigned to CIA had been accomplished and plausible denial retained.
41 “The North Trial's Larger Jury,” The New York Times, March 29, 1989.
“North Testifies All Actions Were Authorized; Reagan's Approval Sought In 5 Memos, Witness Says Series: The Iran-Contra Hearings: Week Eight of the Testimony.” By Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, July 8, 1987.
42 “Video: Oliver North: Iraq a ‘won war,’ Afghanistan a “tough fight.” By Ryan Mills. naplenews.com, February 25, 2010.
43 David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Vintage Books,1974). Pages 181-182.
NARA 104-10301-10004 ~ 5/2/1960 Memorandum “Subject: Liaison with United States’ Agencies on JMARC Activities.” From: Chief, WH/4 J.D. Esterline. To: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)—Action.
Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Volume III. Pages 349-351 of 408.
3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of the Executive Branch
including:d. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon’s military assistant.
e. NSC 5412 Representativesf. Certain United States’ Senators and Representatives, particularly Senator George Smathers of
Florida.During the early Bay of Pigs Planning, CIA representative David A. Phillips met weekly with Henry Loomis, Director, Voice of America, regarding coordination of the United States Information Agency.
44 Robert Sam Anson, They’ve Killed the President (New York: Bantam Books, 1975). Pages 303 and 304.
David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government. Pages 182.
Labels: Arbenz, Armas, bananas, CIA, coffee, Corcoran, Dominican Republic, DTROBALO, Dulles, E. Howard Hunt, Eisenhower, FBI, Guatemala, Holland, PBSUCCESS, Republican, United Fruit, William Pawley, Wisner
posted by David Price Cannon @ 2:47 PM
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