MORE RUTHLESS THAN THE ENEMY: 19: CIA Informant R-1

In late September 1959, the CIA’s Bernie Reichardt asked whether the Agency “had any information on Fabio Freyre, a nephew of Julio Sanchez, who is Bill Pawley’s next door neighbor.” Freyre gave Pawley “some important material” which Pawley “will forward as soon as possible.” Pawley also “told Bernie he will try to get a job for General Martin Diaz Tomayo”1 (one of those who had been selected for the post-Batista junta) giving Reichardt the impression that the Spanish-speaking Miamian was continuing the job-finding role he played in Panama.

When Pawley and Reichardt discussed Freyre, “Pawley suggested to Bernie that a recorder and mike for his office would be a good idea since it would permit him to make recordings of the conversations with Cubans and Dominicans who come in to discuss political matters.”2

As a result, plans were made to survey Pawley’s office to install a recording device and the “mike and wire installation was made on 15 October 1959 by employees of an Office of Security field office” according to a 1975 memo summarizing the agency’s relationship with Pawley that was finally declassified December 15, 2021.3

On October 2, 1959, Pawley reported that “he had been visited again by members of the Fabio Freyre group” and “two visitors from Cuba” who were “acutely aware of the danger they are in by visiting the U.S. and in talking along the lines they do.” Pawley did not reveal their names but asserted “these are people of considerable stature in whom he has confidence.” Pawley’s visitors believed it “is futile to continue to think that any counterrevolution is possible in Cuba.” They believed Castro must be hurt economically. “Lots of people have mentioned burning the sugar fields, but this is an age old revolutionary tactic and in the opinion of these people would be ineffective.” Additionally, a sugar-workers strike would endanger them. “This then leaves only one course of action which is positive sabotage of the mills” by the CIA.

There were also suggestions “to create a fund to reimburse U.S. holders of interests in Cuba for losses suffered at the hands of Cuban government reform programs” and the possibility that Castro would devalue the peso.4

On September 24, 1959, the heads of several sugar companies that had property in Cuba met with Roy Rubottom and other members of the U.S. State Department. Sam H. Baggett, Vice President of United Fruit “considers that the agrarian reform in Cuba will have far reaching effects if it should become a pattern for other countries in Latin America. The low valuation of property and payment in I.O.U.’s, if it spreads, will force the United Fruit Company out of business.”5

Fred Hall wrote ten days later to the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Headquarters Field Office, regarding the desire to install a device at William D. Pawley’s office “for the use of the subject in certain matters of interest to Goliath [the CIA; perhaps more specifically, its domestic intelligence division in Miami, but an odd identifier considering how Goliath fell]. Upon arrival of your agent at Miami, he should contact Mr. Bernard E. Reichardt, a staff employee of Goliath who shares an office with the open Goliath representative, Room 302, 299 Alhambra Circle, Coral Gables, Florida.” The document calls attention to the fact that Pawley “has cooperated with Goliath on numerous occasions and is a personal friend of the Director of Goliath.” The installation “is being done with the full consent and approval of the Subject.”6

Hall soon wrote to Martha Tharpe about the installation of Pawley’s “special piece of equipment.”7

Pawley gave the equipment an immediate test on the 17th and 18th. The first conversation was with “an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-Castro Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the upcoming sugar harvest as reported in UMWA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1[Eduardo Borrell Navarro], a Cuban journalist of operational interest in Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.”

On October 20th, members of “WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October.” On the tape, the unidentified Cuban “said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza” who discussed a plan “to start sabotage” in Cuba but were in need of “moral backing and money” but “Pawley gave him no encouragement” believing it would be like ‘putting money down a rat-hole’” for two reasons. First, “there is no unity among the anti-Castro groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another.” The second reason is that “Castro is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged.”

Pawley “felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on Castro; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organize a revolutionary movement.” The Cuban felt compelled to proceed. Pawley expressed that due to his connections “with the U.S. Government, I can’t get involved in revolutionary movements.’” Pawley added that “he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there but commented that he understood ‘the Dominican Government hasn’t given them a dime.’”8

As it was noted years later by Desmond Fitzgerald, Chief, SAS (Special Affairs Services), William Pawley was “granted a Covert Security Approval for use by JMWAVE on a continuing basis. The references reflect that Subject has been in contact with the Agency for a number of years and that the Western Hemisphere Division was granted a CSA in October 1959 to enable their contact with him.”9

On November 9, 1959, William C. Hunt, Special Agent in Charge, wrote a Memorandum for the Chief, Investigative Division regarding the deployment of the audio taping equipment in Pawley’s office. The device recording conversations for J.C. King to hear was dubbed “Informant R-1” had much thought behind it. “The King coverage was installed within a desk in the personal office of the Subject. The office is located in a modern three-story building in Miami, Florida. The surrounding area, although heavily traveled by vehicular traffic, does not present any severe noise problem which would adversely affect the King coverage. The installation consists of a BK-6 microphone, which has been mounted in a forward section of the subject’s desk, together with an automatic relay system that allows remote operation of the installation. A monitoring post was established in a closet which is located in an adjoining conference room to the Subject’s office. The recording equipment to be utilized consists of one Revere, Model T-700, recorder-producer. All connecting wiring leading from the Subject’s office to the monitoring post have been concealed under wall-to-wall carpet. The automatic switching device for remote operation of the installation has been mounted under the middle drawer of the Subject’s desk and is readily accessible for operational purposes.” While the “King coverage has been established for proper operation on a permanent basis” a later declassified document noted that Informant R-1 needed repair eleven months later.10

Pawley was eager to do the taping. In an undated memorandum he wrote about an impending meeting with Movimiento Anticommunista. “They are a mixture, including Batista’s group, but they are making lots of progress in their organization. I will record the conversation and send it to you.”11 Jorge Garcia Montes, former Cuban Minister of Education, told Pawley that his anti-Castro revolutionary movement in Miami was “a group of people with profound religious convictions, who have not been connected with the Batista regime and who are willing to engage in a revolution against Castro ... becoming convinced that the Castro government is a Communist government which will liquidate religious schools and training. One man in whom Mr. Garcia has the greatest confidence and who is prominent in Catholic activities and organizations is the director of the newspaper Informacion, Angel Salvador Arenas (phonetic).”

When Pawley asked Garcia if he had the two essentials of any revolution—“arms and money”—Garcia stated that the movement was “arming 500 men with rifles, submachine guns and a few bazookas. He was critical of Cuban exiles in the U.S. because they are “unorganized, without plans and anarchical. Any successful revolution must arise in Cuba and not outside. The movement must have no connection with the Dominican Republic or any other outside group.” Pawley expressed his disapproval of “bombing the sugar mills in Cuba. This would destroy a little sugar, but two or three million people would be driven into the Castro camp, by loss of their livelihood.”

Garcia and Pawley also discussed propaganda such as focusing on Castro’s violations of “human rights” and replaying his past radio comments about elections. “Mr. Pawley stated that he thought it would be possible to finance a group of competent writers and propagandists to make a study such as the above and that the radio can be financed.” He saw financial obstacles in financing the purchase of weapons “and getting them to the people. Mr. Garcia thought this could be arranged when the U.S. Government was convinced that this government of Cuba was determined to break off relations.” Pawley then provided a list of names of Cubans perceived by him as having no Batista connections who could compose an anti-Communist liberation group and asked Garcia’s comments.

Garcia noted that Barquin was “in France” and Barbonnett “in Spain.” No thoughts about Melchor. Both Manach and Pasca had government connections. Garcia looked favorably upon Pepin Bosch who had a “good anti-Batista reputation” and although General Diaz Tomayo “has a good reputation in Cuba” he was very “much connected to the past.” If Tony Varona “had guts, he would have been the man of the moment. Still admired by public.”

In responding to the need for arms for “about 500 persons: (250 to 500 rifles and some submachine guns)” Pawley commented “that getting arms out of Miami to Cuba is almost impossible. It might be possible to take them to some Central American country and then to Cuba.” Pawley and Garcia then exchanged telephone numbers.12

In another early November conversation with next-door neighbor Julio Sanchez and his nephew Fabio Freyre, Pawley expressed his disdain of a plane incident which took some Cuban lives. “Castro has capitalized on our mistakes in the plane incident and in the bombing of two sugar plantations and is using the United States as a whipping boy. We must find out how to win over the public in Cuba. We must continue to give Castro enough rope to hang himself. Every time one of his men turns against him and Fidel calls him a traitor or a do-nothing, we should exploit it. Castro is a good propagandist and he will probably save Matos’ life after he has been condemned to death.”

Pawley reiterated that he “does not believe that any invasion from abroad will succeed, but the movement must come from within. There is a substantial movement of about 500 Catholic citizens, who are aroused by the new decree forbidding the teaching of religion in the schools in Cuba. The people who were with Castro are gradually turning against him—the chauffeurs, hotel employees, gastronomic union personnel, etc., and we must help this dropping away. Castro is not mentally fit to govern and it is just a question of time until he goes. The campesinos want to believe in Castro because they believe a Utopia is coming, but Castro cannot deliver.”

Pawley further stressed that “sabotage by plane or from outside the country does more harm than good.” Radio broadcasts were needed, “constantly stressing where Castro had failed in his promises for elections, justice, jobs, land and equal opportunities for all.” He envisioned purchasing time on existing stations as opposed to investing in creating one—“and the U.S. government would not interfere since there was nothing illegal about it, and it is not to be compared with dropping leaflets which is an unfriendly act.”

Pawley “was told that General Pedraza had offered a lot of things” and the General had signed a memorandum of agreement to form a junta “of fifteen to twenty people representing the industrial, commercial, journalistic, professional, Catholic and political sectors of the nation. From this junta must be chosen the President and Council of Ministers who will act as a provisional civil government. Ochos, Varona, and Julio Padilla already have been consulted in this regard.” The national hymn and flag “will be recognized. The only effective guide will be that set forth in the Constitution of 1940.” The new government would abide by the “principles and programs of government as contained in the Manifesto of the Accion Democratica Cristiana (ADC).” Upon revolutionary victory “a civilian government will be established, led by members of the junta” and General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza would be “recognized as the supreme military leader of the revolutionary movement.” In keeping with the Christian principles no “amoral people or those repudiated by the Cuban people can participate, particularly as leaders, in either the military or civilian phase of the movement.”

General Pedraza’s strategy included an “extensive propaganda campaign of not less than twenty days explaining the name and program of the ADC, its ideology and the fact that it constitutes a third force neither Batista nor for Fidel.” Some “$5,000 to $15,000” would be used to cut off Castro’s voice on TV and radio “and “insert ADC programs in the Dominican Republic.” Moreover, the General was committed to “physical elimination of Fidel and of the principal figures of his government” and “destruction of the Air Force at Columbia” as well as “sugar mills.” There also would be “a delegate from General Pedraza with full powers” designated.

Pawley opined that success could only happen by “Getting as many people as possible back into Cuba who are willing to take chances” and by documenting with broadcasts “what a charlatan and a liar Castro really is.” In discussing potential propagandists “Pawley advised against sending General Tamayo to Pedraza at this time” and Pawley was informed that Jorge Manuch “was not included in their list of top people such as [Antonio de] Varona, Julio Padilla and [Dr. Emilio Ochoa y] Ochoa. There wouldn’t be any objections to using Barquin who is in Europe, but they wouldn’t use Pepin Bosch whom they consider a man full of complexes.” When told that a “one million dollar letter of credit has been opened for them in New York” for Pedraza’s group, “Pawley commented that there should be many Cubans who would be willing to contribute.”13

Pawley called a meeting at his office on December 9th at 3:00 p.m. with representatives of different groups that had organized opposition to Castro, including General Martin Diaz Tomayo. The purpose was “to explain to them the events and impressions of Mr. Pawley and Mr. Freyre’s past trip” to “the nation’s capital at the beginning of the week.” They “had the impression that everyone there was most concerned and very worried with the last events developing in Cuba.”

Following their trip to DC, “we traveled to Santo Domingo and had conferences with Generalissimo Trujillo and with General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza of the Cuban Constitutional Army. We had found that Generalissimo Trujillo was in a position more than willing to cooperate in all ways possible to him so that the Cuban opposition would be organized to overthrow the present regime. We had found that General Pedraza had an organized army at his disposal of over 2,000 men of various nationalities including Cubans and that he was most willing to help any organized army that would start working in Cuba or its coast at any moment. To that effect, General Pedraza made good the signed agreement that he had given Mr. Freyre approximately a month before and authorized Mr. Pawley to make any commitments in his name that would facilitate the forming of the opposition block against the present communist government in Cuba.”

Pedraza was “willing to head the military force that would strike. However, “he was more willing to work in close cooperation with a group of army officers such as General Diaz Tamayo.”

Pawley believed it was possible “to prepare two or three bases that would be training centers for the commandos that would ultimately work on the Cuban coast and inside of Cuba.” He felt it was possible “to prepare two strong radio stations that would make themselves be heard clearly in the national territory of Cuba – stations that would be installed in the bases where the personnel would be trained.” To accomplish this, he spoke of the “grave necessity that the movement had to raise from $1,500,000 to $2,000,000 among the Cubans that represented

private enterprise and among the foreign interests that have business interests in the Cuban national territory. To that effect, he gave the idea of considering a printed bond that should be signed by responsible members of the opposition group that it would be a pledge to everyone who advanced the necessary funds to be able to collect at a later date if this patriotic effort succeeded.”

Others attending the meeting gave thanks to Pawley and proclaimed their desire to participate and encouraged “General Pedraza to visit Miami as soon as possible.” Corzo “went as far as stating 40,000 men under arms” inside Cuba would back them in the near future.14

Pawley had shown General Pedraza in the Dominican Republic a list of 19 Cubans that Freyre had prepared “and asked Pedraza whether he would be willing to work with any of the people named on this list. Pedraza replied that he would have no objection to anyone on the list.”

Pawley, not being one to let others decide the future of his Cuba, had “a similar list of 7 persons which was prepared by a Cuban associate of Mr. Pawley whom he did not wish to identify.” Pedraza was OK with them as well. The seven included the same names he had given Garcia: Dr. Jorge Manach, Gen. Martin Diaz Tamayo, Cor. Jacinto Barquin, Cor. Barbonet, Jose M. Bosch, Antonio de Varona and Melchor Gaston.15

On December 15, 1959, agent Jack Gillespie reported on a conversation with Francisco Cajigas who had raised concerns about Pawley’s involvement in the rebellion planning. “Cajigas and Rudy Fernandez had just returned to Atlanta. Cajigas told Gillespie that William Pawley was back in Washington. Trujillo told Cajigas that Pawley had promised that he would have information on the United States’ official position on Cuban matters within three days. An important personage from the Dominican Republic was to come to the United States on 15 December to meet with Pawley on 15 or 16 December. Trujillo said that he is holding the Pedraza force until the United States’ position is known.” Cajigas revealed “that he fears and dislikes Pawley because of some earlier transactions in Cuba in which both were involved. Cajigas expressed dislike for having Pawley support Trujillo since this might involve some future commitments.”

If Cajigas received assurances “that the United States Government will not interfere” with his anti-Castro activities, “he knows where to get some arms in the United States.”

Cajigas received a phone call from Emilio Nunez Portuondo who said “he had seen Pawley on the night of 15 December after the latter dined with Vice President Nixon. According to Nunez, Pawley claimed that he was to meet with the DCI [Allen Dulles] at 0900 on 16 December.” While Nunez had named members of his junta, “Pawley wanted to drop him as head of the revolutionary movement. According to Nunez, Trujillo would not allow the revolutionary army to leave the Dominican Republic without the United States Government’s approval.” Further, Cajigas reported that one junta member, Gerard, who “was hung from his balcony on the night of 15 December was the first man on the list given to Pawley by Trujillo.”

Cajigas noted that “Pawley is having General Pedraza sign notes in excess of a million dollars. Cajigas said that he does not like the way the situation is developing and he will step out of the picture rather than work with the generals and Trujillo, although he would be willing to work with a group of businessmen.”

In response, “Gillespie expressed personal distrust of Pawley, and said that he had discussed Pawley with H. Graham Morison, former Assistant Attorney General now a prominent Washington attorney. Morison spoke adversely of Pawley, whom he characterized as a great opportunist.” Gillespie considers Cajigas a ‘great gentleman’ and hopes someone at the CIA will contact him “at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, room 603.”16

In commenting to the Chief of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division about Jack Gillespie’s conversation with Cajigas, J.D. Esterline not only mentioned the characterization of Pawley as “an opportunist” but also stated that Cajigas “considers Pawley ‘a meddler’ who does more harm than good to the Cuban cause.” Esterline noted that “Bernard Reichardt is also favorably impressed by Cajigas and has described him as one of the most objective and responsible Cubans he has talked to in Miami.” He also disclosed that the FBI reported “that Pawley had been meeting with several exiles at the Mayflower Hotel and on leaving the meeting he told them he was going to meet with Allen Dulles and Richard Nixon.” Pawley who “has been known to compare Trujillo with Abraham Lincoln” is reportedly careless “in conversations with Cubans, which would reveal his covert connection with CIA. However, the above is the only information readily available on this subject.”17

At the request of the Chief, WHD, (known as Thompson) there was a meeting with Freyre at the Mayflower Hotel on December 15, 1959 there were fears “that Castro is going to set a trap and provoke an uprising by falsifying a beachhead, since he knows that something serious is being organized around General Pedraza. For that reason extreme caution is necessary on the part of Freyre’s group.” Moreover, there were reports “that thirty MIGs are being assembled in the Havana area.”

Pawley requested Freyre obtain “the photostat of a letter from the Cuban Minister of Defense authorizing Katherine Taife [Catherine Taaffe] to make contacts to purchase twenty Hawker Hunter planes on the black market. She has been promised a letter of credit for 11 million dollars for the purchase” which is probably “drawn against a Swiss bank account which is in the name of Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara.”

Freyre will use a contact “going into Cuba to determine the arms needs for the army of 1500 and the 3000 reserve.” Freyre also has a group of “750 under Diaz Tamayo and Col. Corso. They are planning landing spots in Cuba.” The morale of Freyre’s Miami group was described by him “as high, but [he] stressed the need to bring General Pedraza to Miami to meet this group.”

Pawley “said that General Pedraza had a valid passport and visa, but that the State Department had instructed the Immigration and Naturalization service to pick him up if he enters the United States.” Two other groups were mentioned by Fryre. “One is Diaz Lanz group whose approach was discouraged as Mr. Freyre’s group does not want to have anything to do with the 26th of July movement. The other is the Batista group offering manpower under Colonel Sanchez Monqueda. Mr. Freyre instructed his second in command (Rodriguez Couzeiro) to confer with the Batista group.”18
Meanwhile the State Department was meeting with business executives regarding protecting their property. On December 22, 1959, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon met with Emilio Collado, Standard Oil Co. (Esso); H. Harvey Pike, Chairman, NFTC Cuba Committee; the NFTC Secretary John Akin; H.B. Sargent, President, American and Foreign Power, and his Executive Vice President H. W. Balgooyen; and G.P. Gardner, Chairman, United Fruit Company.19

During Cuba’s transformation to communism, others who would become intertwined with William Pawley were being arrested in the country. Among them was John V. Martino, a 49-year-old U.S. engineer, who provided services to gambling casinos in Cuba, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment by a military court in Havana for attempting to smuggle out of Cuba the wife and children of a Batista regime ex-police official, Esteban Ventura. Forty-five others were charged with conspiring against the government, including wealthy property owner Eugenio de Sosa Chabau; Batista Army Lt. Antonio Albuquerque Tamayo; and Eugenia Alvarez Martinez, sister in-law of Maj. Pedro Diaz Lanz, ex-Air Force chief, who was charged with smuggling dynamite into Cuba.20

The following week, CIA Director Allen Dulles received a memo from Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, who would soon become involved in assassination plots against Castro. His office approved Pawley for covert activities despite the misgivings of others over his relationship with Trujillo. A primary reason was Informant R-1. “Mr. Pawley will assist WH Division by making available to them reports of conversations held by Mr. Pawley at Miami, Florida, with his contacts among Caribbean revolutionary groups, especially anti-Castro Cuban leaders.”21

Pawley squeezed one last policy-shaping effort into 1959. He called Rudolph E. Gomez, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, at 11:45 a.m. December 31st and gave him “Walter Donnelly’s address in Miami Beach.” He also wanted Colonel King to know that of those arrested in Cuba at Christmastime, only Dr. Eugenio de Sosa y Chabau was identifiable to him having heard his name from General Pedraza.

Pawley also stated that he “was quite perturbed over the activities of Nunez Portuondo. He said that Nunez was making many wild and dangerous statements; for example, he said that Pawley was part of a group of Americans who had investments in Cuba and wealthy Cubans who were active in the opposition movement against Castro; that Nunez had said that Pawley offered Trujillo three million dollars, which money was to be used to support an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic. That this invasion had the support of the United States Government, but Trujillo did not go through with it because Pawley never gave him the three million. Nunez claims that Pawley put his (Nunez) brother’s name on a list of Cubans who would form a junta if and when Castro was deposed. Pawley said that the list Nunez referred to was the one which Pedraza had made up on Pawley’s request and which list Pawley had shown to Nunez when he met him in Washington several weeks ago. Pawley said that Nunez is in a very ‘wild way’ claiming U.S. Government support and is also trying to destroy any efforts which Pawley is making to straighten out the Cuban situation.” Pawley pressed Gomez “that something be done to quiet Nunez down and suggested that Colonel King have a talk with Nunez, pointing out to him the error of his modus operandi and threaten him with expulsion from the United States if he does not stop his agitating tactics. Pawley said that if Colonel King would call Nunez in and have a talk with him, he (Pawley) would be glad to be present at this meeting.”

Gomez responded that he “would pass all the above on to Colonel King and would let him [Pawley] know what, if any, action would be taken concerning Nunez.”22

In the coming months, Informant R-1 would learn of the CIA’s plan to invade Cuba that would end in a disaster.

In January 1960 William Pawley advised the CIA that a Miami police officer had been offered $200,000 to kidnap Rolando Masferrer,23 a Batista thug in Cuba who along with General Pedraza had been on the FBI radar since 1959. Two years later Masferrer would be arrested for leading exile raids against Castro.24 In the following decade, his adventurous life would be capped off by a car bombing in Miami that killed him.25

NEXT CHAPTERS

FOOTNOTES:

1 NARA 104-10049-10364 ~ 9/25/1959 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Conversation with Reichardt, 25 September [1959].” From [REDACTED] WH/III/AO [Carib]. Subjects: Freyre, Fabio; Pawley, William; Diaz, Tamayo.

NARA 104-10049-10373 ~ 9/25/1959 “Report of Contact with Mr. William D. Pawley (201-262094).” To: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. From: Miami. Subjects Pawley, William; Freyre, Fabio.

2 NARA 104-10049-10364 ~ 9/25/1959 Memorandum for the Record “Conversation.” Subjects: Freyre, Fabio; Pawley, William; Diaz, Lanz. From: [REDACTED]

3 NARA 104-10134-10052 ~ Memo “Subject: Pawley, William D. #78435.” For: Chief, SB/1. From: Acting Chief, Support Branch.

Tom Flores mentioned the microphone installation to Colonel King and will mention it to the DCI’s office.

NARA 104-10134-10061 – 4/30/1975 Memorandum for the Record “William Douglas Pawley SF#078 435.”

30 April 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT:
William Douglas Pawley
SF#078 435
1. Subject, a U.S. citizen and former U.S. Ambassador to two Latin American countries, was of interest to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency circa 1952-1954, apparently in connection with Agency operational requirements. In 1959 Subject again became of operational interest to the Western Hemisphere Division in connection with the Agency's activities directed against Cuba. At that time Subject was an executive with a private corporation in Miami Florida. Subject was granted a Covert Security Approval in connection with WH Division's interest circa December 1959.
2. On 7 October 1959 the Chief, WH Division requested the Office of Security to install an audio mike and wire device in Subject's Miami office for the purpose of "making available to WH Division representatives in Miami detailed reports of conversations held by (Subject) with his numerous contacts among Caribbean revolutionary groups, especially anti-Castro Cuban exile leaders." Cited request from the Chief, W Division indicated that Subject is a personal friend of the then DCI and that he had cooperated with the Agency in the past. Subject's file also indicates that the then DCI was made aware of the planned audio installation
3. Subject's file specifically states that the audio mike and wire was to be installed in Subject’s office desk ins such a manner that Subject could activate the recording device while talking to foreign nationals. The file reflects that Subject was not only witting of the mike and wire installation but was in complete control of the audio equipment.
4. Cited mike and wire installation was made on 15 October 1959. By employees of an Office of Security field office. Subject’s file does not reflect when, or if, the audio equipment was removed from Subject's office. However, a report dated January 1961 indicates that the equipment was in operation as of that time as two Office of Security employees were dispatched to Miami, Florida, to repair certain audio equipment which was malfunctioning.
5. Subject's files do not reflect the results of any tape recordings made through the above installation although the file does indicate that any such product would have been given to WH Division representatives.
Subject appears to have remained of interest to the WH Division and to the DCI until as late as 1964.
IDENTITY LIST SF#078 435
Western Hemisphere Division requesting officer: J. C. King, Chief, WH Division
2. Office of Security assigning officer: Jack Bauman
Office of Security employee who installed device: Cryer, John B.
WH Division responsible officer: Tom Flores
Director of Central Intelligence at that time: Dulles, Allen

>> Flores name was redacted in NARA 104-10122-10027 version and other documents.

NARA 104-10134-10051 ~ 10/7/1959 Memorandum “Confirmation of Verbal Request for Installation of Recording Device in Office of William Pawley, Miami, Florida.” For: Director of Security Attention: Mr. Joseph Langdon, Support Branch, 2604 I Building. From: J. C. King, Chief, WH Division.

10/9/1959 FBI Memorandum “Subject: William D. Pawley Information Concerning.” To: Mr. F. A. Frohbose. From: S. J. Papich.

Pawley is a former Ambassador, and reportedly has wide business holding in South America and in the Caribbean area [SEVERAL LINES REDACTED]
ACTION: This information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

NARA 104-10049-10401 ~ 10/14/1959 Memorandum “Re William D, Pawley - #78435 I SB/I.” Subject: Pawley, William D. #78435. From: Special Agent in Charge, Headquarters Field Office.

This will confirm verbal assignment of this matter to your office on 8 October 1959. Headquarters Field Office was designated Office of Origin.
Subject, who currently resides in Miami, Florida ...
Headquarters Field Office is requested to dispatch an agent to Miami Florida so as to arrive during the afternoon or early evening of/6 October for the purpose of installing a recording device in the Office of the Subject for the use of the Subject in certain matters of interest to GOLIATH ...
A representative of Headquarters will call on you prior to the departure of your representative to more fully brief you concerning this matter and to answer any pertinent [REDACTED]
Your written report relative to this matter should be submitted to Headquarters as soon as possible. [SIGNATURE REDACTED]

4 NARA 104-10049-10372 ~ 10/2/1959 CIA Dispatch “Report re Fabio Freyre. Subject Report of Contact with QDDALE, 2 October 1959.” To: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. From: Miami WHD Representative, Patrick I Karnley.
... Rubottom was at lunch so he talked to Bill Snow and passed him this information, again not identifying his sources. I noted that QDDALE also took the time to preach Snow a little sermon about the danger to US interests which would accrue if something isn’t done to change Castro’s ways. During his conversation with Snow he also told him that he was discussing other matters with KUBARK, so Snow may be inquiring of you what it is we are talking to QDDALE about.
10. QDDALE again said that it was a shame that he didn’t have this discussion on tape. I informed him that we were ready to go ahead and survey his office with a view of placing the equipment as soon as possible. I agreed with him tentatively that a technician would be here to survey the premises on Saturday, 10 October.
11. QDDALE called me a few days after my visit with him on 25 September to inform me that the name of the British official with whom the Freyre group had discussed the matter of getting an unihabited island as a staging area ... was Col. Morris Hill ... not only would the British Government not entertain such a notion, but Hill was off base in even discussing the matter with the group and in not reporting their proposal to U.S. authorities.
12. This matter of a British island had been mentioned to me before by George Davis of the FBI ... This information was passed to QDDALE and was greatly appreciated.

See also NARA 104-10049-10371 from Martha Tharpe, WH/3 Carib.

>> King confirmed the request “for the installation of a recording device in the office of William D. Pawley in Miami, Florida, for the purpose of making available to WHD Representative in Miami detailed reports on conversations held by Mr. Pawley with his numerous contacts among Caribbean revolutionary groups, especially anti-CASTRO Cuban exile leaders.” King provided a bio of Pawley noting that in addition to his Ambassadorships to Peru and Brazil, Pawley recently “engaged in petroleum and mining activities in the Dominican Republic and has served as a consultant to the Dominican Government. He has cooperated with this Agency on a number of occasions and is a personal friend of the DCI and of CWH” [J.C. King].

10/9/1959 FBI Memorandum “Subject: William D. Pawley Information Concerning.” To: Mr. F. A. Frohbose. From: S. J. Papich.

NARA 104-10049-10401 ~ 10/14/1959 Memorandum “Re William D, Pawley - #78435 I SB/I.” Subject: Pawley, William D. #78435. From: Special Agent in Charge, Headquarters Field Office.

5 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 24, 1959. Meeting with American Sugar Interests Regarding the Situation of Their Properties in Cuba.” Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1958– 1960, Cuba, Volume VI.

Participants

William F. Oliver, President, American Sugar Refining Company
John A. Nichols, President, Cuban American Sugar Company
B. Rionda Braga, President, Francisco Sugar Company
Michael J.P . Malone, Manati Sugar Company
Frank G. Brown, Jr., V.P., Punta Alegre Sugar Corporation
Sam H. Baggett, V .P ., United Fruit Company
Philip Rosenberg, President, Vertientes-Camaguey Sugar Company
Warren Lee Pierson, Director, Vertientes-Camaguey Sugar Company
W. Huntington Howell, First V.P., West Indies Sugar Corporation
Lawrence Crosby, Vice-Chairman, Atlantica del Golfo Sugar Company
Mr. Murphy—G
Mr. Mann—E
Mr. Rubottom—ARA
Ambassador Bonsal—Embassy Havana

Mr. Wieland—CMA
Mr. English—L/C
Mr. Kwiatek—L/C
Mrs. Mulliken—REA
Mr. Callanan—CSD
Mr. Stevenson—CMA

6 NARA 104-10122-10099 ~ 10/14/1959 Memorandum “Subject: Pawley, William D.” To: Special Agent in Charge, Headquarters Field Office. From: Fred H. Hall.

7 NARA 104-10122-10102 ~ 11/13/1959 Memorandum. To: Martha Tharpe, Room 1005, Barton Hall, Deputy Director of Security (I&S). From: Fred H. Hall.

8 NARA 104-10265-10118 ~ 10/20/1959 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Subject: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami between Mr. William Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October.” From: Martha Tharpe, WH/III/CARIB.

The Cuban said his group needed two things – moral backing and money ... Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement ... he felt that at the present time it would be like “putting money down a rat-hole” for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-Castro groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) Castro is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on Castro; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organize a revolutionary movement.
Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U.S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U.S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn’t know what to tell him – would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, “Having been connected with the U.S. Government, I can’t get involved in revolutionary movements”. Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood “the Dominican Government hasn’t given them a dime.”

NARA 104-10049-10362 ~ 10/20/1959 Memorandum for the Record. “Subject: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October.”

9 NARA 104-10335-10001 ~ ARRB Request “CIA-2: Background Questions On The Collection.”

20 February 1964
Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Security (Investigations & Operational Support) Attention: ID/1, Mr. Coleman
Subject: WILLIAM D. PAWLEY
REFERENCES: UFGT-7664, attached
UFGT-4162, attached UFGT-6961, attached
1. It is requested that Subject be granted a Covert Security Approval for use by JMWAVE on a continuing basis. The references reflect that Subject has been in contact with the Agency for a number of years and that the Western Hemisphere Division was granted a CSA in October 1959 to enable their contact with him.
2. Refer any questions to M. K. Holbik, SAS/Security, ext. 5909

[signed by M.K. Holbik for] Desmond Fitzgerald Chief, SAS

10 NARA 104-10049-10363 ~ CIA Dispatch “Subject: Installation of Tape Recording Equipment in Office of QDDALE.” To: Chief, WH Division. From: Miami WHD Representative.

>> John Cryer surveyed Pawley’s office on October 15, 1959 and “it was decided to make the installation the same night.” There were “several unforeseen difficulties” but Cryer and Karnley got it done that night. After it was tested, “QDDALE was very pleased with this performance.” The Miami Station did not have a recorder to play back and considered borrowing one from KUCLUB (CIA Office of Communication). Tape transcriptions would require a Spanish transcriptionist.

NARA 104-10134-10054 ~ 11/09/59 “Memorandum on William Pawley.” To: Chief, Investigative Division. From: Hunt, William C.

>> On November 9, 1959, William C. Hunt, Special Agent in Charge, wrote a Memorandum for the Chief, Investigative Division regarding William Pawley (#78435 I SB/1). “Reference is made to Headquarters Field Office OOC Final report dated 21 October 1959, submitted by Special Agent John B. Cryer. The [J.C.] King coverage was installed within a desk in the personal office of the subject.”

11/09/1959 “Pawley, William – Confidential Informant R-1 Identified as King Coverage.” Subjects: Pawley, William. To: Chief, Investigative Division.

A number of Pawley documents from 11/09/1959 are Withheld, including:

NARA 1993.08.06.09:17:48:590060 (8 of 26)
NARA 1993.08.06.09:20:00:710060 (9 of 26)

NARA 104-10160-10089 ~ 11/17/1959 “Confirmation that the Recording Device was Installed in William Pawley’s Office.”. To: C/WH Division. From: [CIA] Deputy Director of Security (I&S).

NARA 104-10122-10083 ~ 10/25/1960 Memorandum “Subject: Pawley, William D. #74835 I SB/1 [Repair contact Bob Hopkins].” To: Special Agent in Charge, District Field Office. From: Paul T. Auden.

11 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ Undated. Note from Pawley to CIA. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 171 & 172 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

12 NARA 104-10049-10357 ~ 11/25/1959 CIA Memorandum for the Record. “Subject: Highlights of [REDACTED] Conversation in Spanish between Mr. William Pawley and Jorge Garcia Montes, former Cuban Minister of Education who heads an anti-Castro Revolutionary Group in Miami, during period late October–early November.” From: Phil Toomey, WH/III/Carib.

Pawley said that at the time of the plane incident in Cuba, public opposition to Castro was growing and 30% of the people in Havana were against him. The plane incident was a mistake enabling Castro to blame the U.S. for the victims caused by his forces. Garcia said that such mistakes are inevitable because the Cuban exiles in the U.S. are unorganized, without plans and anarchical. Any successful revolution must arise in Cuba and not outside. The movement must have no connection with the Dominican Republic or any other outside group. Pawley said there has been talk of bombing the sugar mills in Cuba. This would destroy a little sugar, but two or three million people would be driven into the Castro camp, by loss of their livelihood.

Garcia said ... a piece is being printed in Washington looking toward a humanist revolution respecting human rights ... showing all the things which Castro has done in violation thereof. Mr. Pawley commented that the radio might replay what Castro said when he was in the Sierra on the subjects of elections and what he was going to do after the revolution had succeeded ...
Mr. Pawley stated that he thought it would be possible to finance a group of competent writers and propagandists to make a study such as the above and that the radio can be financed. What he felt would be quite difficult to arrange at present would be financing and buying of guns and getting them to the people. Mr. Garcia thought this could be arranged when the U.S. Government was convinced that this government of Cuba was determined to break off relations.
Mr. Garcia asked if Mr. Pawley thought that a group of responsible Cubans could be gathered together in the U.S. with no connections with Batista and not labeled as a revolutionary group, but set up as a liberation, anti-Communist group. Mr. Pawley agreed that no one connected with Batista could be included in such a group and stated that he had written down some names which might be of use and on whom Mr. Garcia might comment.

Garcia’s Comments:

Jorge Manach - Connected with Government.
General Diaz Tomayo - Pretty much connected with the past, but has a good reputation in Cuba.
Barquin - Is in France. Nothing against him in Cuba.
Borbonnett - Is in Spain.
Pepin Bosch - Seems to have a good anti-Batista reputation.
Felipe Pasca - Honest, but too mixed up with present regime.
Gaston Melchor - Has to think about him.
Varona (Tony) - If he had guts, he would have been the man of the moment. Still admired by public.

13 NARA 104-10049-10310 ~ 11/27/1959 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Subject; Highlights of [REDACTED] conversation of Mr. William Pawley with Julio Sanchez and his nephew Fabio Freyre in early November.” From: [REDACTED], WH/III/Carib.

Castro has capitalized on our mistakes in the plane incident and in the bombing of two sugar plantations and is using the United States as a whipping boy. We must find out how to win over the public in Cuba. We must continue to give Castro enough rope to hang himself. Every time one of his men turns against him and Fidel calls him a traitor or a do-nothing, we should exploit it. Castro is a good propagandist and he will probably save Matos’ life after he has been condemned to death. Mr. Pawley does not believe that any invasion from abroad will succeed, but the movement must come from within. There is a substantial movement of about 500 Catholic citizens, who are aroused by the new decree forbidding the teaching of religion in the schools in Cuba. The people who were with Castro are gradually turning against him – the chauffeurs, hotel employees, gastronomic union personnel, etc., and we must help this dropping away. Castro is not mentally fit to govern and it is just a question of time until he goes. The campasinos want to believe in Castro because they believe a Utopia is coming, but Castro cannot deliver.

In the matter of sabotage, Mr. Pawley stressed the fact that it must be carried out entirely within the country as sabotage by plane or from outside the country does more harm than good.

Mr. Pawley recommended as a first consideration of the Cuban exiles to use all the talent which they have at present in the United States to organize broadcast facilities giving complete news coverage to the Cubans, but constantly stressing where Castro had failed in his promises for elections, justice, jobs, land and equal opportunities for all. When he was told that this material had been prepared but that the money was lacking to enter the radio field, Mr. Pawley said that he understood that there were plenty of Cubans around who would be interested in financing this sort of thing rather than revolutionary movements from abroad. He stated that it would not be necessary to purchase a complete radio station, but that radio time could be bought and the U.S. government would not interfere since there was nothing illegal about it, and it is not to be compared with dropping leaflets which is an unfriendly act.

In answer to Mr. Pawley’s query as to what General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza could do to help them, he was told that Pedraza had offered a lot of things. A memorandum signed by Pedraza containing the following points for an agreement was read:

A junta should be formed composed of fifteen to twenty people representing the industrial, commercial, journalistic, professional, Catholic and political sectors of the nation. From this junta must be chosen the President and Council of Ministers who will act as a provisional civil government. Ochos, Varona, and Julio Padilla already have been consulted in this regard.

Only on single hymn and one single flag – the national ones – will be recognized. The only effective guide will be that set forth in the Constitution of 1940.

The principles and programs of government as contained in the Manifesto of the Accion Democratica Cristiana (ADC) should be adopted.

As soon as a revolutionary victory is obtained, a civilian government will be established, led by members of the junta.

General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza is recognized as the supreme military leader of the revolutionary movement.

No amoral people or those repudiated by the Cuban people can participate, particularly as leaders, in either the military or civilian phase of the movement.2) The principal lines of action set forth by General Pedraza are as follows:An extensive propaganda campaign of not less than twenty days explaining the name and program of the ADC its ideology and the fact that it constitutes a third force neither Batista nor for Fidel.The use of TV and radio programs of Castro to cut off his voice and insert ADC programs in the Dominican Republic. This would necessitate altering a radio installation and would cost from $5000 to $15000.The physical elimination of Fidel and of the principal figures of his government.

The principal lines of action set forth by General Pedraza are as follows: {NOTE THE FOLLOWING EXTRANEOUS 2. IS A BLOG SOFTWARE GLITCH]

1. The destruction of the Air Force at Columbia.
2. The destruction of the sugar mills.
3. The designation of a delegate from General Pedraza with full powers.
Mr. Pawley states that in his opinion the only chance of success lay in:
1. Getting as many people as possible back into Cuba who are willing to take chances.
2. Putting out all the well documented broadcasts possible to convince people what a charlatan and a liar Castro really is.
In discussion of the persons who could be used for propaganda the following names were mentioned:
1. General Martin Diaz Tamayo. Who needs a job. Mr. Pawley advised against sending General Tamayo to Pedraza at this time.
2. Jorge Manach. In answer to Mr. Pawley’s query about Manach, he was told that this man was not included in their list of top people such as Varona, Julio Padilla and Ochos. There wouldn’t be any objections to using Barquin who is in Europe, but they wouldn’t use Pepin Bosch whom they consider a man full of complexes.

In answer to Mr. Pawley’s query as to how much financial support could be obtained from Pedraza’s people, it was stated confidentially that a one million dollar letter of credit has been opened for them in New York. Mr. Pawley commented that there should be many Cubans who would be willing to contribute.

14 NARA 104-10049-10307 ~ 12/9/1959 CIA “Minutes of Meeting received at Agency Dec. 16
Representatives of different groups that had organized opposition to Castro. They included: Raul Menocal, Jorge Garcia Montes, Alberto Sosa, Manuel Blanco Canizares, Jose Regalado Santana, Francisco Rodriguez Couzeiro, General Martin Diaz Tomayo, Colonel Corzo [spelled Coronel] and Fabio Freyre.”

We had visited the nation’s capital at the beginning of the week and had the impression that everyone there was most concerned and very worried with the last events developing in Cuba. After that we traveled to Santo Domingo and had conferences with Generalissimo Trujillo and with General Jose Eleuterio Pedraza of the Cuban Constitutional Army. We had found that Generalissimo Trujillo was in a position more than willing to cooperate in all ways possible to him so that the Cuban opposition would be organized to overthrow the present regime. We had found that General Pedraza had an organized army at his disposal of over 2,000 men of various nationalities including Cubans and that he was most willing to help any organized army that would start working in Cuba or its coast at any moment. To that effect, General Pedraza made good the signed agreement that he had given Mr. Freyre approximately a month before and authorized Mr. Pawley to make any commitments in his name that would facilitate the forming of the opposition block against the present communist government in Cuba.
General Pedraza had stated that not only was he willing to head the military force that would strike but that he was more willing to work in close cooperation with a group of army officers such as General Diaz Tamayo” [and Corzo, Barquin and Barbonet]...
It was also explained by Mr. Pawley of the possibility of being able to prepare two or three bases that would be training centers for the commandos that would ultimately work on the Cuban coast and inside of Cuba and also of the great possibility of being able to prepare two strong radio stations that would make themselves be heard clearly in the national territory of Cuba—stations that would be installed in the bases where the personnel would be trained. Also that at Ciudad Trujillo they were more than willing to accept any suggestions that would be made in order to change the radio propaganda that was being made and that up to now everyone concerned considers that it does not help at all the opposition groups.
It was brought up by Mr. Pawley the grave necessity that the movement had to raise from $1,500,000 to $2,000,000 among the Cubans that represented private enterprise and among the foreign interests that have business interests in the Cuban national territory. To that effect, he gave the idea of considering a printed bond that should be signed by responsible members of the opposition group that it would be a pledge to everyone who advanced the necessary funds to be able to collect at a later date if this patriotic effort succeeded.
Dr. Garcia Montes thanked Mr. Pawley for asking him to attend the meeting and he approved very highly of everything that Mr. Pawley said and he thought the idea of the bond was a very good one. He wanted to inform Mr. Pawley of the rumor that some organized opposition was underway in Cuba and...stressed the necessity for the civil representatives of this effort to be known and...the most important point was to get the military underway so as to be able to establish beachheads that would start the organized fighting in Cuba. Dr. Garcia Montes understood that all groups except General Pedraza’s were represented at the meeting and he was assured that Mr. Freyre had sufficient powers to represent General Pedraza on that afternoon. This was ascertained to Dr. Montes by Mr. Pawley.

Same document initialed by JC King is NARA 104-10265-10130

15 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 12/10/1959 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Subject: Meeting [on 6 December with William D. Pawley Reference Memorandum of 9 December with same subject. Prepared by [REDACTED] WH/III Caribbean.” Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 139 & 140 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

Freyre’s list included:

Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla
Gustavo de los Reyes
Goar Mestre
Silvio de Cardenas Arenal
Ernesto Freyre de Varona
Angel Fernandez Varela
Enrique Ovares
Nestor Carbonell Cortina
Julio Cadenas Sanchez
Francisco Rodriguez Couzeiro
Pedro Hernandez Lovio
Felipe Pazos
Justo Carillo
Armando Cainas
Arturo Hernandez Tallaeche
Alberto Fernandez Hechevarria
Emilio Ochoa Ochoa
Eugenio Albarran
Norberto Azqueta

The redacted sender’s name was declassified in 1999: Robert Reynolds, WH/III/Caribbean. NARA 104-10049-10356.

16 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 12/16/1959 “Memorandum of Conversation 12, 15, and 16 December 1959: Participants [REDACTED] and Jack Gillespie.” Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 134, 135, 136 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

On 16 December Gillespie phoned to report that Cajigas had been phoned on the night of 15 December by Emilio Nunez Portuondo. Nunez said he had seen Pawley on the night of 15 December after the latter dined with Vice President Nixon. According to Nunez, Pawley claimed that he was to meet with the DCI at 0900 on 16 December. Nunez mentioned several names, including Julio Sanchez and Juan Gerard (phonetic), who were to be members of the junta. Nunez said that Pawley wanted to drop him as head of the revolutionary movement. According to Nunez, Trujillo would not allow the revolutionary army to leave the Dominican Republic without the United States Government’s approval.
Cajigas said that Pawley is having General Pedraza sign notes in excess of a million dollars. Cajigas said that he does not like the way the situation is developing and he will step out of the picture rather than work with the generals and Trujillo, although he would be willing to work with a group of businessmen.
Cajigas said that Gerard, who was hung from his balcony on the night of 15 December was the first man on the list given to Pawley by Trujillo.
Gillespie expressed personal distrust of Pawley, and said that he had discussed Pawley with H. Graham Morison, former Assistant Attorney General now a prominent Washington attorney. Morison spoke adversely of Pawley, whom he characterized as a great opportunist.
Gillespie urged that someone contact Cajigas, whom he considers to be a “great gentleman.” Cajigas is presently staying at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, room 603. According to Gillespie someone tried to locate Cajigas a couple of days ago. Gillespie asked if we had tried to do so and I replied that we had not insofar as I knew. I told Gillespie that it might be FBI.

17 NARA 104-10049-10342 ~ 2/12/1960: Memorandum for the Record “Material for Possible Use in Discussion with Mr. Pawley.” To: Chief, WHD. From: J. D. Esterline, C/WH4. Subjects: Pawley, William. [Cites 16 December 1959 conversation regarding Cajigas and Pawley].

Comment: Nunez, Cajigas, and Gillespie are known to dislike and/or distrust Pawley. Pawley’s recent break with Nunez is well known. Cajigas says he fears and dislikes Pawley because of some earlier transactions in Cuba in which both were involved; he fears Pawley’s support of Trujillo which might involve some future commitments; and he considers Pawley “a meddler” who does more harm than good to the Cuban cause. Gillespie has expressed personal distrust of Pawley and said he discussed Pawley with H. Graham Morison, former Assistant Attorney General now a prominent Washington attorney; Morison spoke adversely of Pawley, whom he characterized as a great opportunist. Gillespie considers Cajigas a “great gentleman” and has urged that someone in the CIA talk to him. Bernard Reichardt is also favorably impressed by Cajigas and has described him as one of the most objective and responsible Cubans he has talked to in Miami.
Recently the FBI reported (the DBF is being circulated and is not readily available) that Pawley had been meeting with several exiles at the Mayflower Hotel and on leaving the meeting he told them he was going to meet with Allen Dulles and Richard Nixon. Comment: This DBF also said that Pawley has been known to compare Trujillo with Abraham Lincoln.
Comment: There have been other FBI reports concerning Mr. Pawley’s carelessness in conversations with Cubans, which would reveal his covert connection with CIA. However, the above is the only information readily available on this subject.

18 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ December 16, 1959 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Subject: Meeting [REDACTED] and Fabio Freyre in Pawley 201 File.” Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 137 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

It is thought that Castro is going to set a trap and provoke an uprising by falsifying a beachhead, since he knows that something serious is being organized around General Pedraza. For that reason extreme caution is necessary on the part of Freyre’s group.
Doctor Tomeu [a woman] reported an unchecked story that thirty MIGs are being assembled in the Havana area ... Freyre is sending a man to check this story.
Mr. Freyre will obtain for Mr. Pawley the photostat of a letter from the Cuban Minister of Defense authorizing Katherine Taife [Catherine Taaffe] to make contacts to purchase twenty Hawker Hunter planes on the black market. She has been promised a letter of credit for 11 million dollars for the purchase...It is believed that the letter of credit is drawn against a Swiss bank account which is in the name of Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara.
Mr. Freyre has a man going into Cuba to determine the arms needs for the army of 1500 and the 3000 reserve ...
The Freyre group in Miami was said to number 750 under Diaz Tamayo and Col. Corso. They are planning landing spots in Cuba ...
Mr. Freyre described the morale of his Miami group as high, but stressed the need to bring General Pedraza to Miami to meet this group ...
Mr. Pawley entered the meeting at this point and a summary of the above information was given to him. He said that General Pedraza had a valid passport and visa, but that the State Department had instructed the immigration and Naturalization service to pick him up if he enters the United States.
Mr. Freyre spoke about his friend Jose Ignacio Rivero, the Director of Diario de la Marina who has arrived in Miami.
He mentioned two groups which have been trying to contact his group. One is Diaz Lanz group whose approach was discouraged as Mr. Freyre’s group does not want to have anything to do with the 26th of July movement. The other is the Batista group offering men power under Colonel Sanchez Monqueda. Mr. Freyre instructed his second in command (Rodriguez Couzeiro) to confer with the Batista group.

19 “Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1959, Meeting on Protection of American Properties.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI: Cuba. Page 707.

20 “American Sentenced By Cuban Tribunal.” The Lima News, December 19, 1959. Page 1.

21 NARA 104-10049-10164 ~ 12/29/1959 CIA Memorandum. “Subject Pawley, William D.” To: Director of Central Intelligence. From: Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security.

Handwritten note states: This has been returned from DC/I’s office 6 Jan 60.

Born in 1902, Sheffield’s father died when he was about 14 years old. Muriel Edwards, his mother, sold real estate and insurance, while overseeing an 18,000-acre community farm in the Santa Ynez, CA. She also earned a Masters Degree in Education. Sheffield Edwards was accepted to West Point and graduated in 1923. While still in the Army, he was outsourced to the CIA. As Chief of Security, he instituted an assassination plot to kill Fidel Castro involving Johnny Roselli, Sam Giancana, and Santos Trafficante. Edwards reportedly attempted to mislead Robert F. Kennedy, by implying that all assassination plots had been dropped by the CIA. On May 18, 1966 Edwards met with Johnny Roselli who was nervous about Giancana, a man who was soon shot to death in his kitchen. Giancana would be murdered in 1975, and Roselli in 1976. Sheffield Edwards died in 1975 in Leesburg, Virginia. http://ftp.rootsweb.com/pub/usgenweb/nc/newhanover/bios/edwards13gbs.txt

22 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 12/31/1959 Memorandum for the Record “Subject: Telephone Conversation with Mr. William Pawley, 11:45 a.m. 31 December 1959.” From: Rudolph E. Gomez, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 133 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

Mr. Pawley called to give Walter Donnelly’s address in Miami Beach and also to have the following information brought to the attention of Colonel King. Pawley said that of the 40-odd people that were arrested in Cuba over the Christmas holidays, only one of three persons, Dr. Eugenio de Sosa y Chabau, he was able to identify. This name was given to Pawley by General Pedraza.
Pawley was quite perturbed over the activities of Nunez Portuondo. He said that Nunez was making many wild and dangerous statements; for example, he said that Pawley was part of a group of Americans who had investments in Cuba and wealthy Cubans who were active in the opposition movement against Castro; that Nunez had said that Pawley offered Trujillo three million dollars, which money was to be used to support an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic. That this invasion had the support of the United States Government, but Trujillo did not go through with it because Pawley never gave him the three million. Nunez claims that Pawley put his (Nunez’) brother’s name on a list of Cubans who would form a junta if and when Castro was deposed. Pawley said that the list Nunez referred to was the one which Pedraza had made up on Pawley’s request and which list Pawley had shown to Nunez when he met him in Washington several weeks ago. Pawley said that Nunez is in a very “wild way” claiming U.S. Government support and is also trying to destroy any efforts which Pawley is making to straighten out the Cuban situation.
Pawley urged that something be done to quiet Nunez down and suggested that Colonel King have a talk with Nunez, pointing out to him the error of his modus operandi and threaten him with expulsion from the United States if he does not stop his agitating tactics. Pawley said that if Colonel King would call Nunez in and have a talk with him, he (Pawley) would be glad to be present at this meeting.
I [Rudolph E. Gomez] told Pawley that I would pass all the above on to Colonel King and would let him know what, if any, action would be taken concerning Nunez.

23 FBI 105-84265-34 A.J. Weberman. Nodule 7 of former website.

In January 1960 William Pawley advised the CIA that he had been contacted by Arthur Patton, a Commissioner from Dade County, Miami, Florida, who asserted that one of his police officers had been offered $200,000 to kidnap Rolando Masferrer.

NARA 1993.07.21.15:39:42:400280 ~ “Summaries of Activities of Werbell and Others.” Page 4

24 Time, April 21, 1961.

President Kennedy “pointed out that the Justice Department had just indicted Rolando Masferrer, onetime hoodlum leader of a pro-Batista strong-arm squad, for ‘plotting an invasion of Cuba from Florida in order to establish a Batista-like regime.’”

“Crime is Luring Terrorist from Anti-Fidel Ranks.” By Jim McGee. Miami Herald, December 30, 1983.

Growing evidence has linked many reputed anti-Castro terrorists to Mafia-like criminal groups that deal in drugs, extortion and murder, a Herald investigation has found. Instead of fighting Castro, some terrorists have turned to crime. Recent court statements and a wiretap transcript indicate members of the Omega 7 terrorist group served as strong-arm debt collectors for Miami-based drug smugglers.

Labels: Batista, Castro, CIA, Cuba, Esterline, FBI, Freyre, J.C. King, Martino, Masferrer, Pedraza, Reichardt, Tharpe, Tomayo, Trujillo, William Pawley

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December 12, 2009

19: CIA Informant R-1

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